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By granting intracompany loans to their foreign affiliates, multinational firms may reduce 
their tax liability abroad. Many countries have legislated thin-capitalization rules (TCRs) that 
limit the allowable levels of intracompany loans or restrict interest deductibility if certain 
thresholds are crossed. This paper empirically analyzes the effect of the German TCR on 
corporate policy. We find that tightening the regulations in 2001 had some limiting effect on 
leverage. Foreign affiliates reacted by reducing intracompany loans and increasing equity, 
with no significant evidence of reduced real investment. A possible reason for the limited 
impact of the TCR was that multinational firms had the option to work around the regulation 
by using holding company structures. Indeed, holding companies have been used to shift huge 
amounts of intracompany loans onto the books of German affiliates. At the same time, 
however, only part of these observed reorganizations seem to have been a reaction to TCR. 
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1. Introduction 
There is growing empirical evidence that multinational firms adapt their financial policies in 
a tax-efficient way. Studies on the financial structure of U.S. outbound investment (Foley, 
Desai, and Hines 2004, Altshuler and Grubert 2003) as well as German outbound investment 
(Mintz and Weichenrieder 2005) suggest that an increase in the host country tax rate by 10 
percentage points on average increases the leverage of manufacturing firms by some 2–4 
percentage points. Countries with high tax rates therefore seem to attract a considerable 
amount of tax-deductible interest cost. To a considerable extent the debt that multinationals 
shift into high-tax countries takes the form of cross-border intracompany loans. Germany, 
which during most of the 1990s had the highest corporate tax rate among OECD countries, 
is an obvious example. Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) point out that at the end of the 
1990s this type of finance on average accounted for some 20 percent of the balance-sheet 
total of German manufacturing corporations that were held by a foreign direct investor.  
  Governments may react in several ways to curb tax-efficient financing schemes that 
come at a tax revenue cost. One method taken by some home countries of multinationals 
(Japan, the U.S., and Italy) is to use interest allocation rules.
1 Under an interest allocation 
rule, the interest deduction is allocated according to a pro rata share. That is, for tax 
purposes, there may apply a compulsory shift of interest deductions from the parent firm to 
the foreign affiliates.  
  In this paper we will consider thin-capitalization rules that are applied by host 
countries of multinational firms. A thin-capitalization rule (TCR) typically restricts the tax 
deductibility of interest if the amount of loans granted by the investor or a closely related 
party is deemed excessive. In France, for example, an interest payment by a foreign-owned 
corporation to its investor may be qualified as a dividend, if the loans provided by this 
                                                 
1 See Altshuler and Mintz (1995).    3
investor exceed 150% of her equity share. Similar TCRs with various ratios are used, for 
example, in Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
2 In recent years, thin-capitalization 
rules have attracted additional political attention because of their possible interference with 
European law. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) disallowed application of a former 
German thin-capitalization rule to companies operating in Germany if the loan is given by 
an investor located in an EU member country. The ECJ held that the rule selectively 
discriminated against EU investors.  
  So far there have been few empirical studies on the economic effects of TCRs.
3 A 
recent exception is Buettner et al. (2007), who argue that German investment abroad tends to 
be more tax-sensitive if the host country employs a TCR. Overesch and Wamser (2006) 
provide some evidence that tightening of TCR rules reduces the fraction of intracompany 
loans in German FDI financing. The present paper is an effort to further improve our 
knowledge of the working of TCRs in practice. In this paper we will highlight the empirical 
reactions of foreign companies to the German TCR legislation. Besides the immediate 
question whether the introduction or tightening of the TCR has had the desired effects on the 
amount of intracompany loans, a second question is how firms have accommodated. For 
example, a multinational that faces restrictions in financing its German affiliate by 
intracompany loans could react by using more equity or more third-party debt, or it could 
reduce investment along with the amount of intracompany loans.  
  Yet another possibility is that multinationals succeed in working around legal 
restrictions. Particular weak spots in the legislation may allow this. For example, the 
German TCR, which was introduced in 1994, featured a special preference for holding 
companies. It provided a safe-haven debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1 for all nonbank corporations, 
but provided a more lenient 9:1 safe haven for holding companies. That is, an interest 
payment from a German holding company to its foreign investor was safe from being 
                                                 
2 See the decision on the Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH case (C-324-00) of 12 December 2002.  
3 For recent theoretical papers, which analyze thin-capitalization rules as measures of international tax 
competition, see Haufler and Runkel (2008) or Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005).    4
qualified as a dividend as long as ratio of the investor's loans to his or her equity in the firm 
was smaller than 900 percent. Under the German 1994 TCR rule this may have invited the 
use of domestic holding corporations to work around the more stringent 3:1 rule.
4 A main 
purpose of this paper is therefore not only to look at the financing reaction of foreign 
affiliates in Germany, but also to consider empirically, by drawing on information provided 
by the Deutsche Bundesbank database MiDi, the extent to which firms took advantage of 
this loophole.  
  The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will give a 
description of the German TCR and describe its evolution over time. Section 3 introduces 
the MiDi data that are used for the present analysis, and Section 4 then empirically examines 
corporate reactions to the 2001 change in the German TCR. Section 5 investigates to what 
extent holding companies have been used as vehicles to work around the German TCR. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. The Evolution of the German TCR 
In Germany, an explicit TCR was legislated in 1993 and became effective in January 1994. 
Before that date no explicit rules existed.
5 The newly introduced § 8a of the corporate tax 
code (KStG) allowed the authorities to qualify an interest payment as a deemed dividend if 
the loans granted by an investor exceeded three times his or her share in total corporate 
equity as measured at the end of the last fiscal year. In such a case the deemed dividend then 
reduced the tax deductibility of interest for German corporate taxes. An exception applied if 
the firm could convincingly argue that the same loan would have also been granted by a 
nonaffiliated third party or if the loan was only given temporarily. Effectively, the regulation 
                                                 
4 In a recent study, Weichenrieder and Mintz (2007) highlight possible additional roles of holding companies 
for avoiding taxation in an international setting. Empirically, another important role is the minimization of 
withholding taxes.  
5 An attempt to curb thin capitalization by using a bylaw of the finance ministry was overturned by the courts. 
See Weichenrieder (1995, p. 177) for an account of the history of the German TCR.    5
created a safe haven if the intracompany-debt-to-equity ratio of three or less was complied 
with, while higher levels of thin capitalization created the risk of nondeductible interest 
payments.  The German TCR is only applicable if the investor's share in the corporation is at 
least 25 percent (including shares held indirectly via affiliated entities). It also fails to be 
binding for unincorporated businesses like branches of foreign multinationals and 
partnerships. Since the rule only applied to investors who could not claim an imputation tax 
credit for dividends to reduce German income taxes, the TCR was mainly relevant for 
foreign owners of German corporations who are not subject to German income tax.  
As mentioned above, the 1994 TCR gave a preference to holding companies that 
could receive a loan from their owners up to nine times their equity stake in the firm (safe 
haven of 9:1).
6 To be considered a holding company under the regulation, a corporation 
must either restrict itself to the provision of financial services to affiliated companies or hold 
shares in other corporations amounting to 75% of total assets or more.  
  A first revision of § 8a KStG became effective in January 2001. From 2001 the safe 
haven for nonholding companies was reduced to 1.5:1, i.e., an interest payment could be 
deemed a dividend if the loans granted by an investor exceeded her share of the corporate 
equity by 50 percent.
7 While this further limited the amount of intracompany loans provided 
by a foreign parent to a German affiliate, a preference for holding companies continued to 
apply. The safe haven for these companies was set at a ratio of 3:1.  
  A second revision of the TCR was triggered by a ruling of the ECJ. In its decision of 
12 December 2002 it held that the German rule discriminated against EU investors. This 
triggered a revision of the German TCR, which became effective in January 2004. The rules 
continue to allow deeming interest payments to affiliated parties to be dividends if the loan 
granted by an investor exceeds 150 percent of the investor's share of corporate equity.
8 
                                                 
6 A special provision is available for banks.  
7 For loans with a variable interest rate a smaller safe haven of 0.5:1 applied.  
8 Corporations that can argue that a third party would have granted the loan at a comparable interest rate may 
exceed the ratio under the old and new rules.    6
However, they now apply to foreign and domestic investors alike. In addition, the 
preferential safe haven for holding companies was lifted. As a measure to protect small and 
medium-sized domestic firms with loans granted by their shareholders, interest is not 
deemed a dividend if the interest paid to the investor falls short of €250,000. Because of 
lacking data for the post-2004 era, this paper does not attempt to give empirical evidence on 
the effects of this last revision, but is mainly concerned with the introduction and the 2001 
revision. Finally, it should be mentioned that Germany has recently enacted a further change 
in its approach towards thin capitalization. From the year 2008, the thin-capitalization rule 
has been replaced by an earnings-stripping rule.
9 Yet, the experience with previous 
legislation can give potentially important lessons for the future and for other countries.  
3. German FDI Statistics  
To evaluate the impact of German TCR legislation we make use of the German FDI 
database MiDi of the Deutsche Bundesbank. By law, affiliates of foreign investors have to 
report a reduced balance sheet to the Deutsche Bundesbank if the total assets of the direct 
investment meet mild size requirements. For wholly owned affiliates of foreign investors, 
this was DM 500,000 from 1989 to 1992, DM 1,000,000 from 1993 to 2001, and €3,000,000 
from 2002. In the case where a foreign-owned company holds yet another German company, 
information has also to be provided on this dependent company, allowing a look at 
ownership chains of foreign-owned firms in Germany.  
  Among other things, the database gives information on equity, third-party debt, loans 
received from affiliated firms inside and outside Germany, and total assets of foreign-owned 
affiliates in Germany. This information on financial structure makes the data a very good 
basis for our empirical investigation.
10  
                                                 
9 For details see Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007). 
10 Other studies that have used the German FDI database MiDi to identify tax effects on foreign-owned firms 
include Becker, Fuest, and Hemmelgarn (2006) and Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005).    7
The firm-level data from 1996 to 2004 has a panel structure that allows tracking of 
firms across years. Unfortunately, this panel structure is missing for the years 1989 to 1995, 
and during this period firms cannot be traced over time. This implies that some effects of the 
German legislation can only be measured in a limited way. If, for example, the introduction 
of the TCR in 1994 has given incentives to use new holding companies to take advantage of 
their preferential treatment, then this behavior can only be detected since 1996. Similarly, 
changes in the financial structure from the 1994 introduction of the TCR cannot be traced on 
a firm level during the period 1994–1996. Our evaluation of the empirical effects will 
therefore rest largely on the analysis of the 2001 reform of the rules.  
4. TCR and the effect on high-leveraged firms  
A first empirical question is whether the introduction in 1994 and the further tightening in 
2001 of the German TCR formed a binding restriction on firms with pronounced thin 
capitalization and triggered a reduction in the relative prominence of intracompany loans. 
Figure 1 provides some descriptive evidence for nonfinancial incorporated affiliates by 
depicting the ratio R of an investor's loans (plus the loans granted by other foreign-affiliated 
firms) to the ’investor's share of total equity in German-incorporated affiliates over time.
11 
More precisely, the figure plots this ratio for a firm in the 25
th percentile, for one in the 75
th 
percentile, and for the median firm. The firms in the 75
th percentile show very high 
intracompany loans provided by the foreign investor relative to his share in total equity.  
Throughout the period 1989–2002 all nonfinancial corporations in the 75
th percentile 
received loans from foreign investors or foreign-affiliated companies that amounted to more 
than 200% of the foreign investor's equity. Simple eyeball econometrics would suggest that 
                                                 
11 While the German TCR calls for using the lagged values of equity when calculating the safe-haven ratio, we 
have to rely on the current equity for pre-1996 periods, as firms can be followed over time only from 1996 
onwards. For consistency reasons current equity is also used in Figure 1 for later years. Because of a special 
exemption for banks and differences in balance sheets, we excluded financial firms.   8
the introduction of the TCR in 1994 and its tightening in 2001 were accompanied by a 
decrease in intracompany debt. While the pre-1994 value was around 400% for a firm in the 
75
th percentile, it came down to some 300% after the introduction of the TCR and stayed in 
this range for a couple of years, only to experience an additional decrease after the 
tightening of the TCR in 2001.  
Of course, the picture drawn by Figure 1 may be deceptive. It is conceivable that 
even without the introduction and tightening of the TCR, a moderating time trend or other 
reasons for a reduced use of intracompany loans were present. For example, the cut in the 
German headline corporate tax from 40% to 25% in 2001 may have made intracompany 
loans less attractive (see Ramb and Weichenrieder 2005).  
Figure 2 is constructed similarly to Figure 1, but restricts attention to foreign-owned 
branches (including partnerships), which are not subject to the German TCR. The graph 
shows that thin capitalization is not restricted to corporations, but can also be found for 
branches. Throughout the period 1989–2004, more than 20 percent of the unincorporated 
foreign-owned firms had a ratio R above 2: loans from foreign affiliated firms amounted to 
at least 200 percent of the foreign investor's equity. While branches have not been affected 
by the introduction of the TCR in 1994 and its tightening in 2001, they also showed a 
decline in the use of intracompany loans over time. Conversely, during the years following 
the tightening of the rules in 2001, branches showed a smaller reduction in R  than did 
corporations. Like corporations, branches experienced a decrease in the federal German 
profit tax rate from 40 to 25 percent in 2001. 
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Annotation: R is defined as a foreign investor's loans to a German affiliate, divided by his share in the 
affiliate's total capital (= paid up capital + capital reserves + surplus reserves + profit or loss carry forwards). 
The upper curve (p75) denotes the value of R for a foreign firm in the 75
th percentile; the middle curve, the 
median firm; and the lowest curve (p25), the value for the 25
th percentile. The figure represents nonfinancial 
incorporated affiliates the immediate (co-)owner of which is a foreign investor. Holding companies have also 
been excluded.  
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Annotation: The figure represents nonfinancial unincorporated affiliates the immediate (co-)owner of which is 
a foreign investor. For definitions see Figure 1. 
   10
In the next step we want to investigate econometrically the specific reactions that the 
tightening of the TCR rules had on foreign-owned firms in Germany, using micro data. A 
problem that persists even with micro data at hand is that any decrease in the relative use of 
intracompany loans after the introduction may be attributable to a common time trend – the 
(uniform) reduction of the income taxes on branches and incorporated affiliates, or other 
common shocks – rather than to the tightening of the TCR. In other words, we are in need of 
a control group that was not subject to the tightening of the TCR. While foreign-owned 
corporations were potentially affected by the 2001 reform of the TCR, the regulations do not 
apply to foreign partnerships and foreign-owned branches located in Germany. We therefore 
consider these latter types of businesses as a potential control group, which we will in the 
following call simply "branches".
12  
An important firm characteristic that we are interested in is the definition of intrafirm 
debt as it is applied by the TCR. We therefore define the variable IRAT as the ratio of 
intrafirm debt, which a company has received from foreign-affiliated firms, to the total 
equity of the firm in the preceding year. The lag in the denominator of the ratio is motivated 
by the fact that such a lag is present in the relevant definition of the safe haven in the 
German tax code. Since in the following we will concentrate on years for which the data set 
has a panel structure, we can eschew the (somewhat simpler) ratio R, which was used in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2, and replace it with IRAT.  In the year 2000, a company may either 
have had an IRAT of more or less than 1.5. If the reform of the TCR was affecting firm 
financial policy, then we should expect that firms that in 2000 had already complied with the 
2001 safe haven had a smaller incentive to reduce their IRAT than did firms that found 
themselves in a situation beyond the future safe haven. More importantly, within the group 
of firms that in 2000 showed an IRAT of more than 1.5, corporations should have had a 
                                                 
12 A conceivable alternative control group consists of firms with less than 25 percent foreign ownership. We 
did not pursue this alternative for two reasons. First, the number of foreign-owned firms having a foreign  
ownership between 10 and 25 percent is relatively small. Second, unlike branches, these firms have a much 
different financial structure with few loans from foreign-affiliated firms.    11
larger incentive to reduce their IRAT than branches, as the TCR and its revision were not 
applicable to the latter group. In particular, corporations should have felt a larger incentive 
to reduce the ratio than branches. The strategy to empirically identify the effects of the 
regulation therefore is to look at whether corporations that in the year 2000 started with an 
IRAT of more than 150 percent showed a subsequent reduction in the amount for 
intracompany loans that was larger than the reduction for the control groups.
13  
Of course, to be a suitable control group, branches should have similar financial 
structures to corporations. As Figure 1 and Figure 2 show, this was roughly the case in 2000, 
the year preceding the reform.  
We start the empirical analysis by defining several variables. CORP takes on the 
value 1 if the firm under consideration is incorporated (and potentially affected by the TCR). 
It is zero otherwise. Conversely, the dummy BRANCH takes on the value 1 if CORP = 0. 
The variable RATIO is created as a dummy that equals zero if a firm in the year 2000 had an 
IRAT below or equal to 1.5, and that equals one otherwise. Finally, we employ a time 
dummy D01_02 that marks the years 2001 and 2002 in which the tightened regulation was 
effective, but takes on the value zero in 2000.   
The variables used in our regression are built by interacting these dummies:  
(1)  CORP_HIGH_01_02 = CORP ⋅ RATIO ⋅ D01_02, 
(2)  CORP_LOW_01_02 = CORP ⋅ (1 – RATIO) ⋅ D01_02, 
(3)  BRANCH_HIGH_01_02 = (1 – CORP) ⋅ RATIO ⋅ D01_02, 
(4)  BRANCH_LOW_01_02 = (1 – CORP) ⋅ (1 – RATIO) ⋅ D01_02. 
                                                 
13 We decided not to use data on 2003, because such data could have been contaminated by the expectation of 
the 2004 reform.    12
With the help of these variables we can form a baseline regression that uses IRAT as 
the endogenous variable:  
(5) IRATit =  tt + fi + b1 ⋅ CORP_HIGH_01_02it + b2 ⋅ BRANCH_HIGH_01_02 it 
 +  b3 ⋅ BRANCH_LOW_01_02it + b4 ⋅ SALESit  + uit  . 
Here t is a year fixed effect, f is a firm fixed effect, and SALES is the yearly turnover 
of an observed firm. u is the error term. By construction, b1, b2, and b3 measure how the 
endogenous variable developed in 2001 and 2002 compared to the starting year 2000. More 
precisely, because we included time fixed effects, the coefficients capture the differential 
effect with respect to the excluded base group CORP_LOW, i.e., the group of corporations 
that started out with IRAT < 1.5 in 2000. First, we expect that the coefficient b1 will be 
significantly negative, since corporations that started out with IRAT2000 > 1.5 should have 
felt a larger pressure to adapt their financial structure than corporations that were already 
complying. While such a negative coefficient would be consistent with an influence of the 
TCR on financial policy, it could also result from a general tendency of high-leveraged firms 
to return to lower leverage. Therefore, we will also test whether b1 is significantly different 
from the coefficient b2 that takes up the reactions of thinly capitalized branches.  
To perform the regression we introduced several restrictions on the sample of 
selected firms. First, while the MiDi database contains firms that are indirectly owned by a 
foreign investor via a German intermediate firm, we concentrate on firms that are directly 
held by a foreign investor with an ownership share of at least 25%. Only this type of firms 
was affected by the pre-2004 TCR. Second, we drop firms that have more than one foreign 
investor. The reason is that the TCR requires calculating the ratio IRAT on an investor level, 
which from our data is impossible if there is more than one foreign investor. Third, to 
calculate the ratio IRAT for the year 2000 we need 1999 information on equity. This 
additionally reduces the sample.  Fourth, we exclude observations with negative values of 
lagged equity, as in these cases it is not possible to calculate a sensible value for IRAT. 
Fifth, we excluded holding companies, banks, and other financial firms that received a   13
different treatment under the TCR and/or possess a very different financial structure. Finally, 
we require the firms in our sample to have three consecutive observations.
14 This leaves us 
with a working sample of 1699 corporations and branches observed over the period 2000–
2002.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the firms in our four different baskets. Using the 
borderline of IRAT = 1.5, we have 109 branches with low levels of thin capitalization 
(IRAT ≤ 1.5), and 34 branches with a high level (IRAT > 1.5). Corporations are somewhat 
more likely to fall in the high basket than branches: we have 576 high-leveraged 
corporations and 980 for which IRAT ≤ 1.5.  
Within the group of branches (corporations) that in 2000 had a ratio of 1.5 or less, the 
average was 0.286 (0.437). Branches and incorporated affiliates are roughly similar when 
we look at the subgroups of firms that in 2000 had IRAT > 1.5: for incorporated firms IRAT 
then averaged 525 percent, compared to 431 percent for branches.  
Interestingly, the average size of the firms (as measured by turnover) in the four 
baskets hardly depends on incorporation. Indeed, the average sales in the low and high 
baskets are slightly higher for branches.  
Table 2 reports the result for the empirical model in equation (5), while Table 3 
contains the relevant descriptive statistics of the sample. First, consider the column in 
Table 2 that uses IRAT as the dependent variable. As explained above, we grouped firms 
into four baskets. We included dummies for three groups and chose low-leveraged 
corporations as the base case for which no dummy applies. The significant negative 
coefficient of the variable CORP_HIGH_01_02 therefore indicates that corporations that in 
2000 started out with high intracompany loans (IRAT > 1.5) significantly reduced their thin 
                                                 
14  During our period of interest (2000–2002) there was a change in the reporting requirement that induced the 
dropout of a large number of small firms with less than €3 million balance sheet total. The requirement of three 
consecutive observations makes sure that for our sample the number of observations per firm is not correlated 
with firm size. Since the endogenous variable is a ratio with equity in the denominator, equity losses 
sometimes produce very extreme values in the endogenous variable. We therefore excluded 5 percent of the 
remaining firms on the basis that their value of IRAT in one of the three years exceeded 20.9. We also 
excluded a limited number of firms that changed from an incorporated to an unincorporated status during our 
period of interest.     14
capitalization in the following two years, in contrast with corporations that started out with a 
value of IRAT below 1.5.  
While this result is indicative, one may object that corporations in the high-leveraged 
subsample had simply more opportunity to reduce this ratio. To infer whether the tightening 
of the thin-cap rules was effective, it is therefore necessary to compare the corporations that 
started with IRAT > 1.5 with those unincorporated firms that also started out with a high 
level of thin capitalization. If there is a different effect on corporations from that on 
unincorporated firms that were not affected by the tightening of the regulation, then we 
should expect the coefficient b1 to be significantly different (smaller) from the estimated 
coefficient b2. Indeed, this is the case, and the linear restriction b1 = b2  is rejected at the 5- 
percent level. On average, high-leveraged corporations reduced IRAT by 120 percentage 
points more than high-leveraged branches.  
The next five columns report how other balance sheet items have reacted to the 
tightening of the TCR. One way to accommodate a reduction of intracompany loans could 
be to reduce investment. The results in the second column give no evidence of such a 
reaction. The coefficient for high-leveraged corporations does not differ from that of low-
leveraged corporations, nor does it differ from the one for high-leveraged unincorporated 
firms. The hypothesis b1 = b2  cannot be rejected at usual significance levels. The third 
regression shows that, if anything, corporations that tended to be affected by the tightening 
of the TCR increased their financial assets more than other corporations. But the test b1 = b2  
is only rejected at the 11-percent level. Another possible reaction of corporations to 
accommodate to the tightened TCR is to increase equity. In comparison with low-leveraged 
corporations, the increase in equity for high-leveraged corporations indeed is highly 
significant. When the change is compared with the change for unincorporated firms with 
high leverage, however, the difference in differences is not significant. The fifth regression 
in Table 2 shows the relative change in intracompany loans. The estimated coefficient of 
−1.034 for b1  implies that, compared with low-leveraged levered corporations, high-  15
leveraged corporations reduced their average amount of intracompany loans by 103 
percent.
15 The comparison with high-leveraged unincorporated businesses yields no 
significant results, that is, the hypothesis b1 = b2  cannot be refuted.  
The estimated coefficients for log SALES turn out to be insignificant in columns 1 
through 4 of Table 2, but at least weakly significant and positive in columns 5 and 6. This 
suggests that firms that experience an increase in sales tend to prefer an increase in 
intracompany loans and third-party debt over an increase in equity.  
Table 1: Comparison of groups (2000)  
Variable BRANCH_LOW BRANCH_HIGH CORP_LOW  CORP_HIGH
IRAT (avg./median)  0.286 |  0.041 4.317 |  2.949 0.437 |  0.258  5.255 |  3.556
SALES (avg./median)  58486 | 12000 77205 | 22500 56953| 18000   67545 | 21000
Firms 109  34  980  576 
Annotations: The first figure denotes the mean value of a variable in the respective basket, the second denotes 
the median. Sales are measured in thousands of euros.  
 
To examine the robustness of our results and to gain additional insights into the 
working of the thin-capitalization rules, we also tested a finer grouping of firms. For that 
purpose we divided all firms for which in the year 2000 IRAT was larger than 1.5 into three 
subgroups. HIGH1 (HIGH2, HIGH3) indicates the lowest (middle, highest) leveraged 
subgroup with IRAT > 1.5. The dividing lines between these subgroups were drawn such 
that each of the three groups had the same number of firms.
 This produced the following 
thresholds based on year 2000 information. For subgroup HIGH1, 1.5 < IRAT < 2.61. For 
subgroup HIGH2 (HIGH3), 2.61 < IRAT < 5 (IRAT > 5). While this additional grouping 
may allow identifying more exactly what types of firms did react, the split-up produces 
rather small groups of unincorporated affiliates against which the development of 
corporations can be compared. While 188, 189, and 199 corporations fall in the groups 
HIGH1, HIGH2, and HIGH3, the corresponding group sizes are 13, 12, and 9 for branches.  
                                                 
15 This of course must imply that the control group of firms on average increased their intracompany loans, 
allowing for a difference of more than 100 percent.     16
Table 2: Differential effects on thin capitalization of incorporated firms 
 IRAT













b1: CORP_HIGH_01_02  −1.624 0.062 0.084 0.138  −1.034 0.142
 [0.00]*** [0.42] [0.57] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.11]
b2: BRANCH_HIGH_01_02  −0.417 −0.230 −0.826 0.022  −1.161 −0.260
 [0.43] [0.45] [0.14] [0.78] [0.01]** [0.53]
b3: BRANCH_LOW_01_02  0.061 −0.128 0.136 −0.077 0.335 −0.072
 [0.61] [0.44] [0.57] [0.35] [0.43] [0.50]
b4: Log of SALES  −0,009 0.037 −0.008 0.007 0.072 0.066
 [0.77] [0.11] [0.82] [0.23] [0.08]* [0.02]**
TEST b1 = b2  −1.207 0.361 0.910 0.11 0.127 0.402
 [0.03]** [0.36] [0.10] [0.14] [0.78] [0.34]
Observations 5097 5097 5097 5097  5097 5097
Firms 1699 1699 1699 1699  1699 1699
Adj. R
2 0.77 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.82
         
 
Annotations: ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. P-values in 
brackets are based on robust t-statistics (corrected for correlations within firm cells and heteroscedasticity). All 
regressions contain year dummies and a full set of firm dummies, the coefficients of which are not reported. To 
avoid losing firms with zero reported sales, we added 1 one euro before taking logs. The same applies to the 
other logged variables. 
 
Table 3: Sample statistics  
Variable Observations  Firms Average Median Std.deviation 
IRAT 5097  1699 1.945 0.704 3.255 
Log of SALES  5097  1699 9.436 9.852 3.387 
Log of third-party 
debt 5097  1699 7.709 7.938 2.379 
Log of fixed assets 
and intangibles   5097  1699 6.782 7.314 3.066 
Log of financial 
assets 5097  1699 −0.399 0.001 6.787 
Log of equity  5097  1699 8.015 7.954 7.092 
Log of intracompany 
loans 5097  1699 5.551 7.418 5.306 
         
As in the regressions of Table 2, corporations that start out with a low level of IRAT 
in 2000 act as the baseline group against which other groups of firms are compared. The 
numbers of firms and total observations are also kept unchanged. The estimates for the 
variables CORP_HIGH1_01_02, CORP_HIGH2_01_02, and CORP_HIGH3_01_02 
confirm that highly thin-capitalized corporations significantly reduced IRAT after the year 
2000 as compared to less leveraged corporations. The comparison between corporations and   17
branches in different thin-capitalization groups is captured by the three tests in the lower 
part of the table. The results show that only in the extremely leveraged comparison groups 
did corporations have a significantly stronger reduction of IRAT than branches. While this 
seems to suggest limited evidence for the impact of the 2001 reform on corporations, one 
should keep in mind the rather small group sizes.  
As in Table 2, the results of Table 4 show now evidence that corporations reacted to 
the tightened TCR by disinvesting (column 2) or reducing financial assets (column 3). At the 
same time, the results in column (4) suggest that the affected corporations increased their 
equity to comply with the tightened rules. The significance of the reduction in intracompany 
loans depends on the comparison group. The reduction is always significant for high-
leveraged corporations if the comparison is with low-leveraged corporations. If compared 
with branches having similar leverage, then the policy change is only significant for group 
HIGH2.  
   18
Table 4: Differential effects in different thin-cap classes 
 IRAT













a1: CORP_HIGH1_01_02  −0.280 0.077 0.226 0.088  −1.220  0.091
 [0.05]** [0.51] [0.31] [0.04]** [0.00]***  [0.54]
a2: CORP_HIGH2_01_02  −0.623 0.033 −0.069 0.116  −1.031  0.076
 [0.00]*** [0.81] [0.76] [0.01]** [0.00]***  [0.62]
a3: CORP_HIGH3_01_02  −3.846 0.074 0.094 0.206  −0.860  0.252
 [0.00]*** [0.40] [0.63] [0.00]*** [0.00]***  [0.03]**
a4: BRANCH_LOW_01_02  −0.062 −0.128 0.136 −0.077 0.335  −0.072
 [0.61] [0.44] [0.57] [0.35] [0.43]  [0.50]
a5: BRANCH_HIGH1_01_02  −0.674 −0.921 −1.208 0.110  −1.324  −0.902
 [0.06]* [0.35] [0.30] [0.21] [0.00]***  [0.38]
a6: BRANCH_HIGH2_01_02  0.220 0.112 −1.275 −0.061  −0.296  0.071
 [0.82] [0.22] [0.05]** [0.71] [0.09]*  [0.42]
a7: BRANCH_HIGH3_01_02  −0.912 0.046 0.324 0.006  −2.080  0.224
 [0.51] [0.78] [0.65] [0.96] [0.18]  [0.51]
a8: Log of SALES  0.015 0.036 −0.008 0.007 0.072  0.066
 [0.58] [0.10]* [0.82] [0.21] [0.09]*  [0.02]**
TEST a1 = a5  0.393 0.998 1.434 −0.022 0.103  0.993
 [0.30] [0.32] [0.23] [0.82] [0.77]  [0.34]
TEST a2 = a6  −0.843 −0.079 1.206 0.178  −0.735  0.005
 [0.40] [0.60] [0.07]* [0.30] [0.00]***  [0.97]
TEST a3 = a7  −2.934 0.028 −0.229 0.200 1.220  0.028
 [0.04]** [0.86] [0.76] [0.10]* [0.43]  [0.94]
Observations 5097 5097 5097 5097 5097  5097
Firms 1699 1699 1699 1699 1699  1699
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.83  0.82
           
 
Annotations: ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. P-values in 
brackets are based on robust t-statistics (corrected for correlations within firm cells). To avoid losing firms 
with zero reported sales, we added 1 euro before taking logs. The same applies to the other logged variables.  
.   
  By and large, our estimation results indicate that the tightened TCR was successful in 
reducing thin capitalization.
16 At the same time, we find no evidence that firms that were 
most likely to be affected by the new rule reduced investment.
17 Instead, the results suggest 
                                                 
16 This is also confirmed by a recent paper by Overesch and Wamser (2006) that does not consider the exact 
channels through which the firms reacted.  
17 We also checked whether firms that, because of their initial value of IRAT, were particularly affected by the 
TCR tightening had a smaller survival probability in subsequent years, but found no such evidence.    19
that corporations with high levels of thin capitalization increased their equity and tended to 
reduce intracompany loans.  
5. The creation of ownership chains 
  As discussed in the previous section, a foreign firm that faces the need to adjust its 
financial structure because of a thin-capitalization rule may increase its equity base, increase 
the use of third-party debt, or reduce the amount of intracompany loans along with total 
assets.  
  In the German case, also a less straightforward route was conceivable. Given that 
holding companies enjoyed a preferential safe haven under the 1994 TCR, foreign investors 
may have found it attractive to use an ownership chain to circumvent the implications of the 
TCR for nonholding companies. Figure 3 illustrates. Under a direct ownership structure 
(case A), the allowable debt-to-equity ratio was 3:1 for fiscal years 1994 to 2000. Under an 
alternative indirect structure (case B), the parent establishes a holding company and endows 
it with a debt-to-equity ratio as high as 9:1. These funds can be used by the holding company 
to buy the preexisting affiliate from the parent without triggering a net inflow of funds into 
Germany.
18 The larger the purchase price, the larger the total debt and equity that can be 
allocated to the holding company. Since the holding company is a German legal entity, it 
does not fall under the 1994 TCR and may endow the affiliate with debt. But even if it holds 
only equity of the affiliate, the total allowable intracompany debt that could be channeled to 
Germany is larger than in the direct case.  
Unlike in the direct case A, the dividends paid by the affiliates do not directly accrue 
to the parent, but take a route via a holding company. In a last step, to ensure that the interest 
paid on the parent debt is tax-deductible from the profits earned by the affiliate, the two 
                                                 
18 It should be mentioned that the holding company, to qualify for the preferential safe haven, had to hold at 
least one additional company, the size of which was irrelevant, however.    20
German affiliates have to enter into a profit transfer agreement to assure tax consolidation 
between the holding company and the affiliate, which allows interest paid by the affiliate to 
be used to reduce profits transferred to the holding company.  





Debt to Equity 3:1






















After 2000, a change from a direct to an indirect ownership structure still allowed 
larger amounts of intracompany debt for German affiliates, but, as laid out above, while the 
safe haven for normal corporations was set to 1.5:1, the safe haven for holding companies 
was only lowered to 3:1. The scheme laid out above was well known to tax-law practitioners 
(see Krebs 1998), and it is an empirical question to what extent it indeed was used to escape 
the German TCR. Our principal question in this section therefore is the possible extent to 
which foreign-owned firms have changed their internal structure from a direct one to an 
indirect one as illustrated by Figure 3? 
Again, our investigation is impeded by the fact that the database MiDi lacks a panel 
structure for years prior to 1996, which makes it impossible to track foreign affiliates over 
time for the period 1993–1996, so changes in the ownership structure can only be detected   21
after 1996. A change in ownership structure from direct to indirect may have been motivated 
by the TCR if the following conditions hold:  
-  The corporation that is used to form the ownership chain must be a holding company, as 
only those could benefit from the preferential safe haven.   
-  The ownership fraction that the holding company acquires in the affiliate must be at least 
50%, the minimum to establish a profit transfer agreement that is accepted for tax 
purposes.  
-  The dependent affiliate must be outside the banking industry, as this industry is not 
affected by the German TCR.  
Table 5: Affiliates with change from direct to indirect ownership
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  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Year  
Changes from 

















  Changes from 









1997  11 <4    23 19 14  8
1998  18 5    26 13 19  13
1999  16 5    36 17 18  12
2000  13 <4    26 18 19  10
2001  14 5    28 16 17  6
2002  12 <4    23 11 15  7
2003  10 5    20 10 11  6
Total  94 28    182 104 113  62
Annotation: The table reports the number of affiliates that are reported as indirectly held via a German 
intermediate holding company, but were owned directly by a foreign investor in the preceding reported year. 
To be included, the dependent affiliate must not be in the banking sector, and the holding company in the 
ownership chain in the current year must own at least 50% of the equity. As in the preceding section, we 
excluded affiliates with more than one foreign investor.  
 
Based on the above criteria, we found a total of 389 foreign-owned affiliates that initially 
were held directly by a foreign investor and were transformed into an indirect participation 
via a German holding company at some point between 1996 and the end of 2003. In 94 
                                                 
19 In 48 cases a single holding company took over two or more previously directly held affiliates in the same 
year.    22
cases, the change from direct to indirect ownership via a German holding company left the 
identity of the foreign parent unchanged (Table 5, column 1). But some of the restructurings 
were accompanied by other changes in ownership: in 182 cases the inclusion of the German 
holding company was accompanied by a change in the identity of the foreign parent firm, 
but the new parent resided in the same country (Table 5, column 3).
20 In these cases, the 
restructuring in Germany may have been going along with a restructuring of the corporate 
group in the parent country. A German affiliate that used to be held via a certain corporation 
abroad may have been moved to a different corporation within the same company group. 
Hence, the ultimate foreign group that owns the German affiliate could have stayed the 
same. Conversely, the previous parent may have sold the German affiliate to a new investor 
who then preferred a German ownership chain rather than direct ownership. In this second 
case, tax considerations are less likely to be the decisive reason for the change to indirect 
ownership. For example, the new owner at the time of purchase of the German affiliate may 
have already owned a German holding company and for governance reasons may have 
decided to transfer the ownership to it. Indeed, while only 30% of the 94 affiliates in column 
1 were transferred to a preexisting holding company for which data in the database is 
available years prior to acquisition, ownership for 57% of the 182 companies of column 2 
was transferred to a preexisting German holding company. So we decided to report this case 
separately.  
Besides the cases reported in columns 1 and 3, column 5 also reports cases in which 
both the parent and the country of the parent have changed. In these cases, 55% of the 
affiliates were transferred to preexisting holding companies, 45% of the affiliates were taken 
over by holding companies that in the previous years were not included in the database.  
                                                 
20 The MiDi database does not give information on characteristics of the foreign parent, but it reports an 
identification number for the parent and the country of residency.    23
Table 6: Developments in balance sheet items (bn. €) 
    Ultimate parent unchanged  Parent stays in same country  Country of parent changes 






































































































































































































































Equity 97–00  2.1 2.0 −0.2 1.4 6.1 4.7 2.5 3.1 0.6  4.9 13.9 8.9 1.2 1.4 0.2 8.4 16.3 7.9 
 01–03  0.6 0.5 −0.1 1.7 5.0 3.3 1.4 1.6 0.2  5.2 10.1 5.0 0.8 1.1 0.4 3.4 7.4 4.0 
Debt 97–00  4.0 4.1 0.1 1.5 8.3 6.9 3.8 4.0 0.2  6.7 21.5 14.9 2.5 2.4 −0.1 8.0 16.1 8.0 
 01–03  1.2 0.9 −0.3 5.5 6.4 1.0 2.7 3.2 0.5  7.1 17.9 10.7 1.6 2.8 1.2 5.1 8.2 3.1 
Loans from affiliated  97–00 0.9 1.4 0.5 1.4 8.1 6.8 1.8 1.6 −0.2  6.0 20.6 14.6 1.1 1.3 0.1 6.5 13.4 6.9 
companies  01–03 0.5 0.3 −0.2 4.3 5.3 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.2  6.6 15.9 9.3 1.1 2.0 0.9 4.9 7.5 2.6 
Loans from affiliated  97–00 0.7 0.6 −0.2 0.8 6.8 6.0 1.4 0.6 −0.8  3.7 17.4 13.6 0.9 0.5 −0.4 4.2 10.2 6.0 
companies outside Germany  01–03 0.4 0.1 −0.3 3.8 4.3 0.5 1.0 0.8 −0.2  3.6 13.6 10.0 0.7 0.3 −0.4 3.6 4.9 1.3 
Other liabilities  97–00  4.4 5.2 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.2 7.5 7.2 −0.2  0.3 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 3.3 3.1 −0.2 
 01–03  0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.9 1.0 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 1.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Total assets  97–00  10.7 12.0 1.3 3.0 15.2 12.2 14.8 16.6 1.8  9.5 32.9 23.4 4.3 4.7 0.4 22.1 34.6 12.5 
 01–03  2.2 1.8 −0.4 7.6 12.5 4.9 5.0 5.7 0.7  11.6 26.9 15.4 2.9 4.8 2.0 7.2 14.5 7.3 
Fixed assets and intangibles  97–00  2.5 3.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.6 1.7 0.1  0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 −0.1 
 01–03  0.5 0.4 −0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.6 0.7  0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Financial assets  97–00  2.8 3.0 0.3 2.5 12.9 10.4 7.8 7.2 −0.6  6.4 27.4 21.0 1.8 1.9 0.1 16.2 26.1 9.9 
 01–03  0.7 0.5 −0.2 6.3 10.5 4.1 1.3 0.8 −0.6  8.6 22.7 14.0 0.8 1.7 0.9 5.4 10.9 5.5 
Shares in affiliated  97–00 1.7 1.5 −0.2 2.5 12.6 10.1 4.7 3.9 −0.8  5.9 26.5 20.6 1.7 1.8 0.1 15.8 25.5 9.6 
companies  01–03 0.5 0.2 −0.3 6.2 10.2 3.9 1.1 0.7 −0.5  7.7 21.9 14.2 0.8 1.3 0.5 5.2 10.4 5.2 
Loans to affiliated  97–00 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1  0.3 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.1 
companies  01–03 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 −0.1  0.9 0.7 −0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.4   24
  A first question is whether the changes in ownership structure that are described by 
Table 5 have economic significance. The 94 affiliates that are reported in column 1 
represented a balance sheet total of some €13.8bn. evaluated at the end of the year in which 
the respective changes in the ownership link occurred. The equivalent figure for the group of 
182 affiliates in column 3 is €22.3bn., and the balance sheet total of the 113 affiliates in 
column 5 was €9.5bn. These figures compare to the balance sheet total of all directly held 
affiliates in our sample (with at least 50 percent foreign ownership, outside banking) of 
€180bn. in 1997, representing 6198 affiliates. The comparable figure for 2004 is €415bn., 
representing 3980 affiliates.
21 Clearly, the firms that experienced a change from direct 
ownership to indirect ownership via a German holding company were above average size, 
and the total assets involved are considerable, reflecting a moderate but nonmarginal 
fraction of total foreign-owned assets in Germany.  
  In a next step, we investigate to what extent the changes in the ownership links have 
triggered an increase in total debt within Germany and, concurrently, an increase of debt tax 
shelter. Table 6 collects the relevant data. Since the advantages of using a German holding 
company structure were lowered by the 2001 TCR reform, we split all restructurings 
between 1997 and 2003 into those that occurred until 2000 and those that occurred between 
2000 and 2003. When we compare the year before and after the change of the ownership 
link and look at the total debt variable for the 94 firms with a constant ultimate parent, we 
find that the total volume of debt was roughly kept constant. For those firms restructured 
before 2001, columns 1 and 2 indicate that the aggregated value of total debt was €4.0bn. 
before and €4.1bn. in the year after the restructuring. Restructurings after 2000, in total, 
have been associated with a reduction in debt. The fact that the restructurings did not 
significantly increase the debt levels of affiliates does not rule out a tax motivation for the 
change in the ownership link. Such a conclusion would overlook that the holding companies 
heavily increased their debt levels. For these, the aggregated values of total debt increased 
                                                 
21 The reduction of the number of affiliates is due to a redefinition of the reporting requirements in 2002.    25
by €6.9bn. in 1997–2000 and by €1.0bn in 2001–2003. These changes mainly reflect an 
aggregated increase in loans from affiliated companies outside Germany by €6.0bn. 
(€0.5bn.) in 1997–2000 (2001–2003). The total assets of the holding companies involved 
moved from €3.0bn. to €15.2bn. in the first time window and from €7.6bn. to €12.5bn. in the 
second (columns 4 and 5).
22 The increase in total assets that was experienced by the holding 
companies in both time windows was somewhat larger than the total assets of the affiliates 
that were taken over. This may indicate either that the purchase price (paid to the foreign 
parent) was considerably larger than the equity of the acquired affiliate, or that the holding 
company bought other assets during the year of the ownership change. The database allows 
calculating the increase in financial assets of the holding companies that are associated with 
the year of the ownership change. The vast majority of the €12.2bn (€4.9bn.) in years 1997–
2000 (2001–2003) reflected an increase in shares in affiliated companies. Only a small 
portion of the increase came from investments in other financial assets. Hence, if the holding 
companies invested in other assets than the German affiliate, which was acquired from the 
parent, then the other financial investments were also in affiliated firms.  
  Overall, the data for the 94 cases in which a directly held affiliate has been 
transformed into an indirect participation implies that the transactions were suitable for 
reducing taxable income in Germany. On the one hand, the funds channeled to Germany are 
used by the holding companies to earn tax-exempt income from owning shares in affiliated 
companies.  On the other hand, a large fraction of the funds provided by the foreign parent 
took the form of intracompany loans, the interest on which is tax-deductible in Germany and 
taxable abroad. The extent to which the ownership restructurings have pumped debt into 
Germany has changed over the years. While the holding companies involved have increased 
their borrowings from affiliated companies considerably when the holding company 
privilege was still generous (i.e., before 2001), the effect in later years has flattened off.   
                                                 
22 For this calculation the debt and total assets of firms that did not appear in the data prior to the ownership 
change was set to zero. Since the reporting requirements are rather moderate, this should lead to only small 
errors.    26
 
  Next, consider the 182 cases in which the affiliate experienced a change from direct 
to indirect participation, but the ultimate parent changed even though the country of the 
ultimate investor stayed the same. Again, a comparison of the last year before the ownership 
change to the first balance sheet after the change shows that, also in this group of 
restructurings, most changes in leverage occurred at the level of the German holding 
companies, but hardly at the level of the ultimate German affiliate. Total assets of the 182 
affiliates moved from €14.8bn. to €16.6bn. (€5.0 to €5.7bn.), and their debt increased by 
€0.2bn (€0.5bn). At the same time, the shares in affiliated companies of the holding 
companies involved increased by €20.6bn. (€14.2bn.) for restructurings in the period 1997–
2000 (2001–2003). The takeover of the preexisting affiliates went along with a huge 
increase in debt levels at the holding company level. Total debt increased by €14.9bn. and 
€10.7bn. in the two time windows, and the lion’s share involved intracompany loans.  
  Finally, consider the 128 cases of changes in the ownership chain that implied a 
change of the country of the foreign direct investor. Evaluated at the year after the 
ownership change, the total assets of the affiliates were €4.7bn. and €4.8bn. during the two 
time windows. Compared to these values, the increase in the shares of the holding 
companies was quite pronounced at €9.6bn. and €5.2bn. In the first (second) time window, 
the restructuring was associated with an increase of cross-border intracompany loans by 
€6.0bn. (€1.3bn.).  
  Taken together, the figures in Table 6 imply that the 389 cases of restructuring of 
ownership were accompanied by an increase of intracompany loans to German holding 
companies of €37.4bn., 68% of which occurred before the tightening of the TCR from 2001.  
  Since a large fraction of holding companies that served as vehicles to increase 
German intracompany loans are new establishments, this points to a potential problem of 
previous studies that tried to identify the effects of international tax differentials on leverage 
decisions. Often these studies employ fixed-effects panel estimations that cannot take up the   27
effect of new firms. To the extent that changes of leverage are conducted by using new 
vehicles, within estimators that only capture the change occurring in existing affiliates may 
underestimate debt shifting activities.  
  The above calculations illustrate that ownership restructurings have been extensively 
used to increase the level of intracompany loans from abroad. A remaining issue is the 
extent to which the increase in intracompany loans would have been possible without the use 
of holding companies. Instead of using intermediate holding companies, a directly held 
affiliate could pay out accumulated earnings as a dividend and borrow back these funds from 
its foreign parent. The attractiveness of this policy option depends of course on whether the 
TCR are already binding, and this is likely if the intracompany loans are larger than the 
relevant save haven. Evidence is provided by considering equity and intracompany loans 
from abroad aggregated on a company group level for those foreign investments that have 
been restructured using a German intermediate holding company. For this purpose, we take 
the sum of all intracompany loans that a group of German affiliates owes to affiliated 
companies outside Germany and divide it by the total equity of all the affiliates that are 
directly held by the foreign parent. We do not include the equity of indirectly held affiliates, 
as this should already be reflected in the equity of the German intermediate firm. Groups of 
companies are identified by the same identification number of their foreign parent. All 
numbers are collected for the years after an ownership change.  
  The figures collected in Table 7 show that in many cases, the aggregated ratio of 
cross-border intracompany loans to parent equity (post restructuring) would have complied 
with the respective TCR even without making use of the holding company privilege. For 
example, the median ratio for all company groups before 2001 was 2.136, when the German 
TCR still provided a safe haven of 3. Similarly, the median for 2001–2003 was 1.228, when 
1.5 was allowed by TCR standards. This suggests that for some foreign-owned firms the 
ownership restructuring may have been the preferred way of increasing leverage in Germany 
for other reasons than working round the TCR. At the same time, for quite a number of   28
cases, the overall ratio of intracompany loans to net equity was beyond the respective safe 
haven, and the intention to work around the TCR is a prime candidate for explaining the 
restructuring.  
Table 7: Group financing ratios (total loans from affiliated firms outside Germany divided 
by equity of directly held firms) 
 Observations  25
th percentile  Median  75
th percentile 
All restructurings         
1997−2000 239  .331  2.136  5.063 
2001−2003 150  .238  1.228  2.745 
Same parent only         
1997−2000 58  .986  2.454  5.613 
2001−2003 36  .219  0.899  2.784 
Parent country unchanged, parent 
changed  
     
1997−2000 111  .316  2.695  6.569 
2001−2003 71  .316  1.738  2.814 
Parent country changed          
1997−2000 70  .178  1.058  3.877 
2001−2003 43  .237  0.771  2.311 
 
Table 8: Number of restructurings in thin-capitalized groups 
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1997−2000  58  24    111  65    70  27 
2001−2003  36  11    71  48    43  19 
Total  94  35    182  113    113  46 
 
Table 8, which takes advantage of the same measure of leverage as Table 7, reports 
on the exact number of restructurings that led to a thin capitalization above the safe haven 
level in the absence of a holding company and its privilege. Aggregated across all three 
types of restructurings, this has been the case for some 50% of the restructured affiliates. If 
we look at the relevant fraction of total debt increases due to higher holding company debt, 
we arrive at 58.1% for the 1997−2000 period and at 77.2% for 2001−2003. The available 
evidence suggests that debt increases were concentrated in groups of firms with pronounced   29
thin capitalization (after restructuring). At the same time it suggests that in many cases the 
overall debt levels reached by the ownership change would have been possible without the 
intermediate holding company.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The paper has looked at the experience of the German TCR from various angles. The 
introduction in 1994 as well as the tightening of the rules in 2001 was followed by a visible 
reduction of thin capitalization among the foreign-owned affiliates with the largest fraction 
of cross-border intracompany borrowings as a fraction of equity. However, the role of the 
thin-capitalization rules needed careful econometric consideration, as the intracompany 
loans of branches, which did not fall under the TCR, experienced the same declining trend. 
The econometric analysis produced a significant effect of the TCR: the reduction of the ratio 
between loans from affiliated parties and foreign-owned equity was more pronounced for 
high-leveraged corporations then for unincorporated affiliates starting with a similar share of 
thin capitalization. In the German case, the TCR did not seem to produce a reduction in 
investment. While not or only weakly significant, our results suggest that affiliates reacted 
by using more equity and more third-party debt.  
  A second part of the paper has highlighted a loophole of the legislation that was due 
to a preference given to holding companies. For this reason, foreign multinationals could 
work around the German TCR by introducing a German intermediate holding company that 
used loans from affiliated companies abroad to buy a preexisting affiliate. Based on the 
MiDi data of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the paper shows that for the period 1997−2003 the 
use of holding company structures has been responsible for a total of more than €37bn. of 
new intracompany loans in the nonfinancial sector, which should have led to a sizable 
increase in tax-deductible interest in Germany and a loss in tax revenues. However, 
restructurings of this type were also observed in cases where the relative level of   30
intracompany loans was low. Therefore, not all of the restructurings that have taken place 
can be interpreted as an effort to work around the TCR. Instead, for some of the cases the 
use of a leveraged intermediate holding company may have been considered an easier 
approach than an increase in the leverage of the operating affiliate. This is a potentially 
important message for empirical estimates of the elasticity of leverage with respect to tax 
rates. In many cases the empirical identification strategy has looked at the within variation 
of tax rates and leverage for a given set of affiliates. If multinationals rather react to tax 
differentials by setting up new affiliates, then the within variation may seriously 
underestimate the tax-rate elasticity of leverage.     31
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